A widely
held belief about the Qur'an is that it makes its basic appeal to
emotions and not to reason. Among the advocates of this view were the Muslim
philosophers of early centuries who used a theory of intellectual classes
to support it. According to this theory, people have different levels of
understanding: some are capable of grasping truth in its theoretical, abstract
form (these are the philosophers, the most gifted intellectually), some
are capable of rational thought but only within a closed system of belief
(theologians make up this category), but most people have a humdrum intelligence
that can comprehend truth only in its gross, material from (these are the
masses, the great unwashed). Since scripture addresses the vast majority
of mankind, the argument runs, it must cater to the needs of the largest
of the three groups, that of the commoners, who can understand truth only
when it is presented to them in material terms, for example through the
use of similes and metaphors which pictorialize truth. It follows that,
as a rule, one should not expect scripture to argue logically that is to
say, with the aim of convincing the philosophers --- but only to appeal
to emotion, for that is the only way to persuade and sway the ordinary
people.
This view, however, reckons without
the Quran, for numerous verses of the Book make it explicit that it addresses
human reason, that it faculty of reason. That is not all. The Quran, as
several modern Muslim scholars have endeavoured to show, offers sound logic
and reasoning to support its fundamental teachings. The Egyptian scholar
Muhammad Abu Zakrah in his "I`jaz-ul-Quran" (Egypt: Dar-ul-Fikr Al `Arabi,
[Introduction 1970], Part Two, pp. 364-388) discusses several aspect of
Quranic jadal (argumentation). The Pakistani scholar Amin Ahsan Islahi
in his Urdu commentary of the Quran, "Tadabbur-i-Quran" (Lahore, 1967-1980)
repeatedly draws attention to the Quranic modes of reasoning. In the following
paragraphs, we have attempted to isolate another aspect of Quranic logic:
fallaciousness of reasoning noted by the Quran in the arguments of disbelievers,
whether of Islamic or early times. Under headings familiar to students
of logic, we shall cite, and briefly explain, a few instances of such fallaciousness.
Needless to say, the following account is not exhaustive. The translation
of the Quranic verses cited is my own.
A few prefatory remarks
should be made. First, all the fallacies cited occur in the statements
of disbelievers, typically in statements made by the opponents of the Prophets
when the latter invite them to reflect on the message they had brought
and believe in it because this was the right and rational thing to do.
The Quran thus underscores the fact that while the Prophets asked their
nations to think, ponder and exercise reason, the nations, unable to respond
with sound arguments, argued fallaciously. Second, a number of fallacies
can be identified quite easily, but some only after a close study of the
verses or passages in question. The Quran since it is not a textbook of
logic, is not concerned to preserve the exact form of an argument. While
reconstructing the form of a fallacy noted by the Quran, for example, one
has to keep in mind, on the one hand, such linguistic features of Classical
Arabic as ellipsis, and, on the other, the Quranic methods of presentation,
like the method of citing a counter-example. Considerable effort may thus
be needed in discovering the structure of a fallacy. Cases in point are
the fallacies mentioned under ignoratio elenchi and petitio principii.
Finally, although I have not provided any example of it, I believe that
sometimes several fallacies are stated together in a single Quranic ayah
(43:57-58, cited under ignoraio elenchi, would seem to exemplify the fallacy
of argumentum ad populum as well). A logician with a keen sense of the
Quranic language and method can expect to reap a rich harvest.
1. ARGUMENTUM AD BACULUM
The Latin word baculum means "stick." An argumentum ad
baculum (or argumentum baculinam), therefore is one that appeals to the
stick --- or force. Force does not have to be used actually; the threat
of its use would suffice to generate the fallacy. Several nations mentioned
in the Quran responded to their Prophets by issuing threats to them. For
example, in Surah Hood we find the people of Shu`aib saying:
"They said: `Shu`aib, we do
not understand much of what you say. We see that you are weak. Had it not
been for your tribe, we would have stoned you, for you are not too difficult
for us to handle'." (11:92)
In
Surah Shu`araa, Pharaoh threatens Moses with imprisonment if the latter
were to take anyone other than him as a deity1.
Already (vs. 19) Pharaoh has given a veiled threat to Moses by alluding
to the manslaughter Moses committed earlier: `And you committed the act
that you did commit'. Abraham is not only threatened, he is actually thrown
into a fire: `They said, `Burn him up, and come to the aid of your deities,
if you wish to do something2'
(21:68). This happened only after Abraham had routed in debate the people
in general (6:74-83), the king (2:258), and the custodians of the temple
(21:51-71; 37:85-98). Noah is threatened by his people with stoning (26:116),
Lot, by his people, with exile (26:167).
2. ARUGMENTUM AD HOMINEM
The fallacy consists in an attempt
to refute someone by making disparaging remarks about him rather than by
responding to his argument. In other words, not the argument but the man
(L. homo, "man") behind the argument is attacked. The nobles of the people
of Noah rejected him and criticized his followers on the following grounds:
"We see that you are just a
human being like us. We see that only those people have followed you who
are quite obviously the lowliest among us. And we see the you are in no
way superior to us. In fact, we suspect that you are liars." (11:27)
In other
words: Noah'a message must be rejected because his followers happen to
be such - and - such people (see also 26:11). 21:36 says that the Quraysh
start making fun of Muhammad the moment they catch sight of him, and pay
no attention to his message.
For other examples of this fallacy,
see 23:47 (Pharaoh and courtiers/Moses and Aaron), 26:27 (Pharaoh/Moses),
26:153-154 (Thamud/Prophet Salih), 26:185 (Madyanites/Shu`aib), 43:52 (Pharaoh/Moses).
3. ARGUMENTUM AD POPULUM
In this fallacy one makes an appeal to the crowd, trying
to play on their feelings. In the following verse, Pharaoh, unable to deny
the miracles shown by Moses in his court, turns to his courtiers and tries
to provoke them by suggesting that Moses intends to occupy their land and
banish them from it:
"He said to the courtiers around
him: `This one here is a sophisticated magician. He intends to expel you
from your land by means of his magic'..." (26:34-35)
Another
example, again involving Pharaoh and his noblemen on the one hand and Moses
and Aaron on the other, is found in 20:63-64, where the common Egyptians
are told that Moses and Aaron are magicians who intend to expel them from
Egypt and, at the same time, destroy their superior culture, and that they,
the Egyptians must do their best to counter their magic.
4. ARGUMENTUM AD VERECUNDIAM
This is an appeal to one's sense
of modesty, so that the addressee would find it hard to make a response
without being indecorous or indirect. In Surah Shu`araa, Pharaoh, faced
with Moses demand to allow the Israelites to leave Egypt, says: `Did we
not bring you up when you were a child? And did you not stay with us for
many years of your life?'3
(26:18). Pharaoh thus tries to force Moses into a situation from which
the latter would find it hard to escape without offending against such
values as gratitude and reverence.
Appeal to distinguished names
is also subsumed under the argumentum ad verecundiam. Several nations,
when reproached by their Prophets for idolatry, justified their conduct
by appealing to prestigious names in their past history. Here, for example
is the dialogue between Abraham and his people:
When he said to his father and
his people: `What are these images you are so attached to?' They said,
`We have found our forefathers worshipping them'."(21:52-53)
In Surah Zukhruf, there is an
example of the fallacy of "begging the question". Upon the mention of Jesus
in the Quran, the leaders of the Quraish tried to mislead their people
by saying, first that the Quran speaks of Jesus as a deity, and second,
that the Quran holds Jesus-as-deity to be superior to their own deities,
the angels.4 Having made this
statement, they asked their people as to who was better --- the angels,
whom they worshipped or Jesus? Now the conclusion drawn by the Quraish,
namely, that the Quran considered Jesus-as-deity superior to angels-as-deities
was as baseless as the premise on which this statement was based, namely,
that the Quran spoke of Jesus as a deity. Here are the two relevant verses
of the surah:
"And no sooner is the son of
Marry is cited as an example than your people start raising a hue and cry
about him. They say: `Are our deities better or he?' They say this to you
only for polemics sake. The fact is that they are a contentious lot." (43:57-58)
The
Quran comments by saying (vss. 59 ff.) that the Quraish leaders know quite
well that Jesus is not presented in the Quran as a deity but as a human
being who was sent to the Israelites as a Prophet.
6. IGNORATIO ELENCHI
This is the fallacy of irrelevant
conclusion. If a person is asked to prove or disprove something and he
proves or disproves something that is not at issue, he would be committing
this fallacy. The following verse alludes to this fallacy:
The case of Jesus in the eyes of God is like
that of Adam: He created him from earth and then said to him, `Be!' and
he comes into existence.5"
(3:59)
Christians regard Jesus as the son of
God because, they argue, he was born without a father. To the Quran, however,
the conclusion is not warranted, for otherwise Adam, who was born without
any parent at all, would have a greater claim to deity.
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