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Book Name :
A History of Medieval Islam
Author
: J.J.Saunders
Pages
: 219
Publisher
: Toutledge, London & New York.
Price
: $ 15
A History of Medieval Islam by. J.J.
Saunders is an objective and pleasing account of West-Asian history from
500 AD to 1260 AD. Serious students of Islamic history will probably find
the book a bit brief, while casual readers will definitely enjoy its easygoing
and highly readable nature. On the whole, it must be noted that Islamic
history is a sadly under-represented field that is in great need of such
works.
Saunders begins this history with
an account of Pre-Islamic Arabia - a backward, weak and divided entity
that existed on the periphery of the mutually antagonistic Empires of Sassanid
Persia and Byzantium. These colossi were locked in perpetual conflict with
one another, often enlisting a Northern Arabian tribe as an ally with the
purpose of breaking the deadlock – only to suppress the tribe if it got
out of hand. The settled inhabitants of Southern Arabia (modern day Yemen
and Oman) did not fare much better than their nomadic cousins in the north
during the sixth century AD. The dislocation engineered by Axumite and
Sassanid rivalry caused agricultural production to fall, which in turn
precipitated de-urbanisation. In the light of such unfavorable objective
conditions, it is not surprising that Arabs regard the sixth century as
a Dark Age. The question that arises from such an analysis is that if Arabia
was regressing economically and politically from 500-600 AD, what was it
that transformed this waterless waste into the heart of the greatest empire
the world had ever seen?
In discussing the Prophet (sws) and
his role in the rise of Islam, Saunders is very objective. He does not
try to delve into the vagaries of character analysis as many other western
scholars tend to. Instead, he simply places the accomplishments of the
Prophet Muhammad (sws) before the reader and relates them to the objective
conditions prevalent at that time. Such an approach leads Saunders into
defending the Prophet’s integrity, honesty, and judgement.
Saunders points out that the campaign
the first caliph, Abu Bakr (rta), launched in order to crush the
‘false prophet’ (Musaylimah) founded the basis of the Islamic military
tradition. The Muslims learned to cope with the problems of war management
such as logistics, tactics, organisation, formations, and cartography.
The sheer scale of the war effort turned Arabia into a disciplined, tough,
and highly motivated armed camp, ably led by fearless (and intelligent)
commanders. In the light of such factors, it was most wise of the first
caliph to keep his restless minions gainfully occupied. The decision to
divide the army into three corps, and send it into Syria, Palestine and
Mesopotamia was truly ingenious. Saunders pays rich tribute to the manner
in which the caliph ‘Umar (rta) tackled the problems of civil administration
through a series of regulations, tolerant government, and impeccable strategic
decisions. He notes that the Muslims were more tolerant towards the various
Christian sects than the were to one another and that the much-criticised
tax put on non-Muslims can be thought of as a substitute for military service.
By 644 AD, the Islamic Empire stretched from Egypt to Iran, when the second
caliph’s untimely death at the hands of an assassin precipitated a war
of succession a dozen years later.
The civil wars that followed the murder
of the third caliph ‘Uthman (rta) in 656 AD and ‘Ali’s controversial
ascension to the post of caliph are all dealt with in a dispassionate and
detached manner by Saunders. He simply puts the facts before the reader,
and lets one draw one’s own conclusions. Indeed, as far as he is concerned,
the conflict between the two sects that emerged from the civil wars was
essentially between those who wanted hereditary succession and those who
didn’t. For the casual reader, however, going through the countless intrigues
which characterised the period between 656 AD and 684 AD will be quite
vexing.
Between 684 - 750 AD, the Umayyads
launched an offensive which almost managed to turn their dreams of universal
empire into a reality. By 712 AD, the Islamic empire stretched from Spain
to Sindh. This expansion was truly remarkable in light of the fact that
the Arabs actually managed to digest their conquests – till this day, the
territories occupied by the Umayyads remain the heartland of the Islamic
world. By 750 AD, however, the empire of the Umayyads had reached the limit
of its territorial expansion and no Islamic state has since then unified
so large an expanse. Saunders notes that the abolition of the seven hundred
year old Roman/Persian frontier created a massive free trade zone, whilst
the conquest of Spain and North Africa during this period flooded the treasury
with specie. As the mighty Imperial Navy guarded the commercial interests
of the empire, the organization of the government along Persian lines greatly
enhanced the efficiency of the administration.
The opportunity cost of successful
imperialist expansion was that the court at Damascus became a center of
conspicuous consumption that contracted sharply with the simplicity of
the early Caliphs. The situation was further compounded by a sharp rise
in the inflation rate as a result of the injection of so much foreign specie.
The expanding bureaucracy and army required higher taxes to be imposed,
and gradually, as conquests stopped, and Islam began to face reverses in
Spain, and Berber revolts in N. Africa, the hold of the center began to
weaken. The masses, never particularly fond of the Umayyads in any case,
became alienated from their rulers and the enthronement of a weak caliph
in 744 AD set the stage for the Abbasid Revolution. Saunders, aside from
giving an informative account of the Abbasid Revolution, notes that it
accelerated the trend towards centralised despotism and the ‘Persianisation’
of the Islamic world.
After the death of Harun-al-Rashid,
the political unity of the Islamic world was shattered, as successive caliphs
proved unable to deal with the centrifugal tendencies unleashed by growing
resentment at Arab colonialism. The Abbasid caliphate further sealed its
fate by seeking both the temporal and spiritual leadership of the Islamic
world – and failing to gain either. Various inquisitions were unleashed
with the result that each wavering sect was given a martyr. One of the
sects was the Alid, which was suppressed in 851 AD on the orders of Mutawakkil.
The shrine of Hussain at Karbala was destroyed and pilgrimage to it was
forbidden. For a while the Alid movement died down, only to rise with great
ferocity in the form of the ‘Isma‘ilian Schism’.
Unfortunately, as Saunders admits
there is no comprehensive record of the objective conditions that got the
Isma‘ilian schism and the Fatimid anti-caliphate going. The paucity
of reliable data creates a situation where objective study is very difficult
to accomplish. Nevertheless, the author tries to piece together a coherent
picture through some logical inferences. The most interesting of these
is that since the series of events which led to the establishment of the
Fatamid anti-caliphate in 909 AD is so astonishing, there must have been
some sort of organised movement involved.
The conversion of many Turkish tribes
to Islam in the tenth century AD was as momentous an occasion as the conversion
of the Franks to Christianity in 496 AD. The acquisition of high posts
by the Turks from the enfeebled Abbasids paved the way for the rise to
Turkish dynasties on Arab soil. This infusion of fresh blood reinvigorated
the Sunnite cause, but spelt doom for Arab dominance and the Byzantine
Empire. In 1071, Anatolia fell to the Seljuks, thus depriving the Byzantine
of their largest source of revenue and soldiers. The Turks had arrived
just in time to confront the Crusades and the Mongols.
Saunders analyses the crusades in
the context of the relative positions of the Christian World and the Islamic
World in 1000 AD. At that date, Europe had just begun to recover from the
barbarism of the preceding 600 years with the conversion of the Vikings
to Christianity. However, Islam had begun to be subjected to a long series
of nomadic invasions that would last until 1269 AD. The temporary shift
in the balance of power, coupled with Pope Urban II’s propaganda, and the
Byzantine Emperor’s desperate squeals for help in the face of growing Seljuk
power, set the Crusades in motion.
The Crusades were a military failure
for the Christians though they did manage to gain some initial success.
Saunders, looking at the overall strength of the Islamic world, notes that
they were a nuisance more than a threat. Nevertheless, it took the Muslims
almost a century to gain a degree of cohesion under the great Saladin who
unified Iraq, Syria and Egypt and then expelled the Crusaders from most
of their strongholds. Thanks to his efforts, Islam had recovered a great
deal of its unity and prosperity by the start of the thirteenth century.
Saunders notes that trade was growing and with the caravans, the Qur’an
too was being spread. Things seemed to have become quite tranquil.
Few could have imagined that it was just the calm before the Mongol storm
that would destroy much of the scientific and philosophical progress that
the Arabs had made over the preceding 450 years.
Saunders concludes his book with an
overview of Medieval Islam. This is very helpful if you are just a casual
reader of history and are interested in understanding the nature of Islamic
history without going too much into the detail. Saunders has written a
wonderful little book that is as refreshing as it is concise in its scope.
Meaningful in its context, and readable in its presentation.
Courtesy: The Daily Nation Dec 3, 2000
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